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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF BARTER
JOHN

R. ALLISON*

"Barter is back," announced a well-known trade publication.'
The normal response, upon recalling the essential clumsiness of barter,
is to scoff at such a statement. An examination of available data, however, may temper one's initial skepticism. Since 1970, the number of
organized barter exchanges, which primarily perform clearinghouse,
brokering, and record-keeping functions, has increased from a dozen to
over one hundred. 2 Current estimates of the dollar value of barter
transactions vary greatly; however, in view of the fact that some of the
larger exchanges are handling over $100 million worth of transactions
per year, it would seem safe to assume that the value of bartered goods
and services today amounts to several billion dollars annually.3 All
sources indicate that volume is increasing quite rapidly, with estimates
4
of annual growth ranging up to twenty percent.
The "double coincidence of all wants" necessary for barter to
function,5 coupled with the advent of relatively stable currencies and
the need for standardized record-keeping units, led at an early date to
the obsolescence of direct trading as a major factor in commerce. 6 This
most ancient of transactional forms never disappeared entirely, however. Periodic revivals of barter activity have occurred throughout history, usually in economically harsh times. 7 For example, the early
* Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at Austin;
J.D., Baylor University, 1972.
1. Thompson, When Money Gets T'ght, Bargainby Barter, PuRCHASING, Nov. 7, 1979, at 91
[hereinafter cited as Thompson].
2. Leff, Trading Flourisheson Many Exchanges You Never Heard Of, Wall St. J., Sept. 8,
1978, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Leff).
3. See, e.g., Bartering Gets to Be a Business in the Billions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
21, 1977, at 47; Business Bulletin, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 5; Graustark, Marketing."
Trading Game, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1977, at 62; Leff, supra note 2; Thompson, supra note 1, at 91.
4. See, e.g., Using Barteras a Way of Doing Business, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 4, 1980, at 57 [hereinafter cited as Using Barter].
5. Starr, The Structure of Exchange in Barter and Monetary Economies, 86 Q.J. ECON. 290,
302 (1972).
6. See, e.g., A. DEL MAR, HISTORY OF MONETARY SYSTEMS (1895); Niehans, Money and
Barterin GeneralEquilibriumwith TransactionCosts, 61 AM. EON. REV. 773 (1971) (in which the
author explains the choice between money and barter in terms of differing transaction costs).
7. See generally Jones, The Origin andDevelopment of Media of Exchange, 84 J. POL. EON.
757, 774 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Jones], where the author concludes: "Thus individual optimization implies that the pattern of trade must always be some combination of direct barter and
monetary exchange."
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1930's witnessed such a resurgence, due largely to a scarcity of cash and
high unemployment. 8 The commodity shortages of the World War II
era brought about a similar increase in the use of barter. 9 These and
other instances were merely temporary responses to the economic aberrations of the moment. The same factors that led to barter's obsolescence continued to prevent it from playing a significant economic role.
The revitalization of barter in the 1970's, which seems to be gaining momentum as we begin the 1980's, is also attributable at least
partly to exigent economic circumstances.' 0 These conditions, primarily inflation of a destructive intensity and persistent shortages of many
basic materials, may also prove to be transitory. And the current interest in barter may well diminish as in the past. On the other hand, the
unprecedented magnitude and endurance of the present movement is
such that we probably ought to pay some attention to it. Although no
reasonable observer seriously expects a return to a barter-based economy, there is a pervasive notion that barter's current popularity will
persist. " Providing support for this belief is the fact that computerization has enabled organized barter groups and their members to maintain acceptably precise transaction records' 2 without the use of
established monetary units and without the problem-ridden issuance of

scrip. '3
THE ANTITRUST ISSUE

The concern of the Internal Revenue Service that barter may produce unreported income has been well publicized.' 4 Very little attention has been given, however, to the fact that the barter revival may
also involve antitrust implications. The problem, very simply, is that
barter could easily be viewed as the transactional equivalent of reciprocity. Essentially, reciprocity is mutual partronage-"I'll buy from
you if you'll buy from me." The recognition of reciprocity as an antitrust violation dates to the 1930's when the Federal Trade Commission
8. See, e.g., W. WEISHAR & W. PARRISH, MEN WITHOUT MONEY (1933) [hereinafter cited
as WEISHAR].

9. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 1, at 93.
10. See, e.g., G. BURTT, THE BARTER WAY TO BEAT INFLATION (1980).

11. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 1, at 91; Using Barler, supra note 4, at 57. See also Jones,
smpra note 7, at 774.
12. See, e.g., Myers, Bartering ir Back, SMALL Bus., Oct./Nov., 1977, at 17 [hereinafter cited
as Myers].

13. See, e.g., L. GRINSTEAD & W. WISSLER, BARTER SCRIP AND PRODUCTION UNITS AS
SELF-HELP DEVICES IN TIMES OF DEPRESSION 31 (1933).
14. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 2, at 1, col. 4; Thompson, supra note 1, at 98; Using Barter,
supra note 4, at 57.
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successfully challenged the reciprocal dealing practices of three firms. '5
Although the intent underlying a barter transaction, as well as its ultimate economic impact, will frequently differ markedly from the purpose and effect of reciprocity, the similarity inform dictates caution.
There can be no doubt that barter may amount to reciprocity in its
simplest, most direct form. The problem for corporate counsel, as well
as for purchasing and sales managers, is to insure that this facial similarity does not become substantive.
In the remainder of this article, we will briefly examine the current
legal status of reciprocity, consider some of the substantive differences
between barter and reciprocity, and highlight those situations in which
barter may engender the same risks of antitrust litigation as reciprocity.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF RECIPROCITY

The GeneralAttitude
Reciprocity clearly would be a rare occurrence in an economy consisting primarily of firms producing only a single product or a single
line of closely related products. Opportunities for reciprocity, as well
as actual incidences of the practice, increase with the diversification of
16
firms into multiple, and particularly disparate, products and lines.
The general attitude toward reciprocity could be characterized as
unreceptive at best and openly hostile at worst. The United States
Supreme Court has referred to reciprocity as "an irrelevant and alien
factor intruding into the choice among competing products, creating at
the least a priority on the business at equal prices."' 7 Donald Turner,
an economist and Professor of Law at Harvard, as well as former head
of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, has said:
[It may be stated flatly that reciprocity ...has little or nothing to be
said in its favor. Competition works satisfactorily only when success
rests on lower prices, better quality, better service, and the like. Reciprocity distorts the pattern of trade away from the ideal, with no
compensating economic advantages.' 8
15. In re California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); In re Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16
F.T.C. 67 (1932); In re Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
16. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 170 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SULLIVAN].

17. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965) (citations omitted).
18. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313,
1387 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
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Legality

Since the United States Supreme Court's 1965 decision in FTC v.
ConsolidatedFoods Corp.,19 it has been recognized that a merger may
be illegal under section 7 of the Clayton Act 20 when it creates a substantial probability of reciprocity in the relevant market. Of more direct relevance to the topic under discussion, however, is the legal status

of reciprocity considered alone, in a nonmerger context. The statutory
provisions which may in particular situations be offended by reciprocity are section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combi-

nations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, 2 ' and section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of
22

competition.
Considering the fact that there really is so little "law" on the question of reciprocity, there is a remarkable consensus as to the illegality of
the practice. There are only a handful of court decisions, but reciprocity has fared very poorly in those few cases. 23 The Justice Department's reciprocity litigation has produced consent decrees rather than
precedent-setting judicial opinions. 24 But the Justice Department has
19. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). In addition, a firm's use of reciprocity may violate the prohibition
against attempted monopolization contained in § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), if
the firm possesses market power of a substantial enough degree that the combination of its power
and conduct creates a dangerous probability of successful market domination. See, e.g., W.L.
Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1974), modfed, 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.
1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
23. Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 444 U.S.
831 (1979); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Grow Chem. Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. 75,133 (S.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Continental Can Co., [1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,132 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. 74,338 (W.D. Mo.); United States v. Crane Co.,
[1973-11 Trade Cas. 1 74,329 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1973-11
Trade Cas. 74,574 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. Jackson's Atlanta Ready Mix Concrete Co.,
[19721 Trade Cas. 73,827 (N.D. Ga.); United States v. Martin Marietta Corp., [1972] Trade Cas.
73,858 (D. Md.); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., [1972] Trade Cas. 1 74,070 (S.D.N.Y.); United
States v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., [1972] Trade Cas. 73,828 (N.D. Ohio); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1972] Trade Cas. 74,053 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., [1972]
Trade Cas. 73,917 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC., Inc., [1972] Trade Cas. 74,069
(N.D. Tex.); United States v. Evans Prods. Co., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,450 (N.D. Ill.); United
States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,437 (D.N.Y.); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, [1971] Trade Cas. 73,587 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. National Steel
Corp., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,495 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. Reynolds Metal Co., [1971] Trade
Cas. 73,626 (E.D. Va.); United States v. Inland Steel Co., [1970] Trade Cas. 73,197 (N.D. Ill.);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. 73,246 (N.D. Ohio); United States v.
Armco Steel Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. 73,283 (S.D. Ohio); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. 73,376 (E.D. Pa.); United States v. PPG Indus., Inc., [1970] Trade Cas.
1 73,373 (W.D. Pa.).

ANTITR UST IMPLICATIONS

spoken and acted so decisively on the question, and has been so successful in obtaining out-of-court settlements prohibiting reciprocity,
that we have an unusually clear picture of its status even without much
formal law. Moreover, reciprocity has been subjected to a great deal of
scrutiny by various writers, who have shown uncommon accord in their
views and who have added much to the refinement of our ideas about
the practice. 25
In their analyses, most authorities have identified three different
factual settings in which reciprocity may occur and have labeled the

practice, depending on its setting, as coercive, voluntary or unilateral.
Coercive Reciprocity
The coercive imposition of reciprocal dealing is not only the least
defensible of the three types on ethical grounds but also is the most
clearly illegal. This variety was the first to attract the government's
attention, being the subject of three FTC proceedings in the 1930's.26

In substance it is analogous to the almost universally condemned tying
arrangement, 27 in that it represents a leveraging of market power. Ty-

ing, on the one hand, represents a leveraging of market power as a
seller: "We'll sell you X, which you need, only if you will also buy Y

from us." Coercive reciprocity, on the other hand, represents a leveraging of market power as a buyer: "We'll continue to buy B from you
(and you really need us, don't you) only if you will buy C from us."

Reciprocity under such circumstances usually would violate both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act where the

evidence establishes that the leveraging firm has sufficient monopsony
25. See, e.g., Barton, Reciprocity, 21 Bus. LAW. 613 (1966); Dean, Economic Aspects of Reciprocity, Competition and Mergers, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 843 (1963); Dunne, Reciprocity: The
Hazards of Rackscratching, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 159 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dunne]; Ford,
Reciprocity, Advisory Procedures,and ClassActions, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 633; Handler, Emerging
Antitrust Issues. Reciprocity, Diversfcation and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433 (1963);
Harvith, Reciprocity and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 40 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1965); Hausman,
Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Hausman]; Marshall, Reciprocity as an Emerging Issue, 29 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 195 (1965);
McLaren, Reciprocity: The "Hobgoblin" of the Antitrust Critics, 39 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 224
(1969); Turner, supra note 18. Some commentators, however, have disputed the notion that reciprocity is inimical to the proper functioning of the free market. See Markovits, Tie-ins, Recprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE LJ. 1397 (1967).
26. In re California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); In re Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16
F.T.C. 67 (1932); In re Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
27. Tying and exclusive dealing are the specific focus of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1976), and, when tangible commodities are involved, may be challenged under this statute as
well as § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(1976). Since § 3 of the Clayton Act is directed only
at the use of power by a seller, reciprocity would not fall within its prohibitive language.
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power over coerced firms to effectuate the arrangement.m-)8 Sufficient

buying power will ordinarily be present whenever the leveraging firm is
an important enough customer to overcome coerced firms' independent
buying decisions. The primary result, of course, is a distortion of allo-

cative efficiency by causing coerced firms' buying decisions to be based
on something other than price, quality, or service. 29 Another, perhaps
secondary, concern is the infringement of coerced firms' fundamental
30
freedom as traders.
There can be yet another adverse effect where the leveraging firm's
competitors in the selling market do not have similar capacity for reciprocal dealing, either in magnitude because of the leveraging firm's
greater size, or in kind because these competitors do not have the same
consumer-producer structure that creates the opportunity. In this instance, the leveraging firm's competitors in the selling market will be
foreclosed from a portion of the market and placed at a competitive
disadvantage for economically illegitimate reasons. 3' Market foreclosure can, of course, have an adverse impact on potential as well as existing competitors. Prospective entrants into the selling market may be
somewhat more reluctant to attempt entry if a significant portion of
that market is inaccessible because of leveraged power. Differently
stated, reciprocity possesses the potential for increasing entry barriers
32
in the affected market.
Courts in the future may further analogize between tying and reciprocity and require, in addition to substantial buying power, that a substantial amount of commerce in the selling market must have been
affected. Even if this additional requirement is imposed, it is ordinarily
rather easy to surmount. For example, in FortnerEnterprisesv. United
States Steel Corp. 33 the United States Supreme Court indicated that in
a tying context, $190,000 of sales in the secondary market to all customers under similar arrangements is sufficient to establish an effect on a
34
substantial amount of commerce.
supra note 16, §§ 170-71.
29. Turner, supra note 18, at 1387.
30. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 170. Justice Black, in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 4 (1958), stated: "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty .. "
31. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 170.
32. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 282
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER].
33. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
34. Id. at 502.
28. SULLIVAN,
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Voluntary Reciprocity
This form of reciprocity essentially involves an exercise of mutual
volition by the participants. 35 It may occur because neither firm possesses sufficient market power as a buyer to enforce its own will, or
because both firms are relative equals in the possession of such
power. 36 If the former situation exists, the reciprocity is really just an
outgrowth of mutual convenience rather than a leveraging of market
power. Moreover, reciprocity in such a setting is unlikely to involve
either foreclosure or a distortion of allocative efficiency of a substantial
enough magnitude to cause any concern. There is not, therefore, a
great likelihood of a violation of either section 1 of the Sherman Act or
37
section 5 of the FTC Act in these cases.
If, on the other hand, voluntary reciprocity involves participants
who each possess substantial power, the dangers to competition and the
likelihood of illegality are about the same as in the case of coercive
reciprocity. Indeed, the economic harm may even be greater because
the effects are likely to be felt in two markets rather than in one.
Thus, the only real economic or legal basis for distinguishing voluntary from coercive reciprocity is that the voluntary variety may some38
times be harmless.
Unilateral Reciprocity
This label has been given to a firm's practice, whenever practicable, of buying from those who are also its customers for other products. 39 There is no agreement, coerced or voluntary, to maintain the

reciprocal pattern of dealing. The economic effects of pure unilateral
reciprocity rarely would be such as to cause concern. Without agreement or coercion, the volume of transactions affected ordinarily would
be of small magnitude. And the probable randomness of these transactions would usually preclude any real distortion in a given market.
Legally, true unilateral reciprocity could not run afoul of section 1
of the Sherman Act. By definition, that statute applies only to agreements (either coerced or voluntary). One caution is in order at this
35. See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 25, at 161; Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading
Bows/or Arrows, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1966). It has also been called "negotiated" reciprocity
or "mutual patronage." Dunne at 161.
36. SCHERER, supra note 32, at 281-82.
37. Id. at 282.
38. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 16, §§ 170-71.
39. See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 25, at 161; Hausman, supra note 25, at 882. It has also been
called "systematic" or "volunteer" reciprocity. Dunne at 161.
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point, however. For Sherman Act section 1 purposes, an agreement
can be proved by circumstantial evidence. 40 Thus, if what appears on
the surface to be unilateral reciprocity is so systematic that mere coincidence is unlikely, a coerced or voluntary agreement can be inferred.
Section 5 of the FTC Act can apply to unilateral conduct, 4' but the
usual absence of harm from tru/y unilateral reciprocity would ordinarily preclude a finding of illegality under this statute.
In antitrust analysis, it is elemental that the "rule of reason" is the
governing standard for judging a particular practice. Under this standard, conduct is illegal only if it unreasonably restrains trade. Application of the standard essentially involves scrutiny of the purpose and
effect of the practice. On the other hand, a few practices, such as price
fixing and horizontal market division, are deemed to be "per se" illegal.
Such activities, once proved to have occurred, are ruled illegal with
little, if any, examination of underlying motivations or ultimate effects.
They are so treated because their effects ordinarily are so clearly adverse and the likelihood of any procompetitive effects is remote. 42 Reciprocity, particularly the coercive variety, may very well be viewed as a
per se violation.43 However, in the following discussion of the substantive differences between barter and reciprocity in terms of the participants' intent and the economic effects of the practices, it is presumed
that barter would be examined under the rule of reason. This same
analysis may also be employed, if necessary, to support an argument
that barter should in fact be judged under the rule of reason rather than
the per se rule. 44
BARTER VS. RECIPROCITY:

THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES

Dierences in Intent
Antitrust law is primarily concerned with economic effects, either
actual or predicted. 45 Intent is often important in antitrust analysis,
however, for at least two reasons. First, intent is frequently an excellent predictor of effect. An adverse impact on competition is much
40. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).

41. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
42. See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 16, §§ 63-72.
43. Id § 171.
44. Allison, Ambiguous Price Fixing and the Sherman Act: Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable
Analysir?, 16 Hous. L. REV. 761, 829-31 (1979).
45. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (191!).

ANTITRUST IMPLICA TIONS

more likely to result if it was intended. 46 Second, condemning the
wrongful intent by itself simplifies the judicial administration of complex legal questions and serves as a deterrent to illegal conduct. 4 7 Regarding proof of intent, it is basic that a particular intent may be
inferred from conduct that was likely to achieve the allegedly desired
48
result.
Barter and reciprocity admittedly are transactionally similar on
the surface. In most cases, however, the intent behind a barter deal is
quite different from the intent behind reciprocity. Barter is much more
likely to be merely a response to uncontrollable market factors, 49 rather
than a practice initiated for anticompetitive reasons. Even though computerization may increase the feasibility of systematizing and standardizing barter, it cannot make barter as easy for a firm to facilitate as
reciprocity. If a firm wishes to achieve the particular economic effects
of reciprocity (leveraging of power, etc.), it is not likely to think of barter as the means to that end. The far greater probability is that such a
firm will employ one of the forms of reciprocity. And, as stated above,
the absence of an anticompetitive purpose makes anticompetitive effects less likely.
As earlier stated, one of the most important facets of the current
barter movement is the dramatic growth of organized barter exchanges.
For at least two reasons, a firm's use of such an intermediary can be an
important factor in the examination of intent. First, the use of an intermediary makes coercion much more difficult to accomplish. A firm
wishing to engage in coercive reciprocity under the guise of barter, for
instance, is quite unlikely to go semi-public with its device by using the
services of a formal exchange. Therefore, the use of such an exchange
should be very strong, perhaps conclusive, evidence of a legitimate
motive.
Second, barter exchanges differ in their organization and in the
services they provide. If an exchange merely brings the traders together, the transaction continues to bear a surface resemblance to reciprocity. If, on the other hand, the exchange employs standardized units
of value (referred to by various names, such as "trade credits"), maintains records of client accounts, and permits positive and negative ac46. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 71.
47. See SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 71.

48. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
49. See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 8-10 supra.
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count balances, the firm-to-firm characteristic of barter begins to blur.50
Transactions begin to look less like barter and more like a distinct subset of the economy in which a different medium of exchange is used.
This type of "barter" bears much less resemblance to reciprocity than
the direct form. The less the resemblance to reciprocity, the less is the
chance that a firm's motive would ever be questioned.
Differences in Actual Adverse Effects
A particular arrangement undertaken without an anticompetitive
purpose may nevertheless violate the antitrust laws if its actual or probable effect is anticompetitive. 5 1 Therefore, even though barter transactions, in comparison with reciprocity, are not as likely to be
anticompetitively motivated, they will be illegal if significant anticompetitive effects are an actual or probable result.
Despite the surface similarity between barter and reciprocity, their
effects usually will be quite different. The potential adverse economic
effects of reciprocity, or barter, are not likely to occur unless the practice is systematic and recurring. If isolated or random, the effects will
be nil. A single firm, or a handful of firms, will in most cases not be
able to engage in barter with sufficient facility to cause antitrust concern. Barter on a large scale, employing standardized methods and record-keeping units, can best be accomplished through an organized
exchange. 52 As previously observed, many such exchanges presently
exist and several of them are quite large. 53 However, they have thus far
been used primarily by small firms and individuals representing a vast
number of different markets. 54 Thus, the bartering presently taking
place through organized exchanges is unlikely to have a measurable
adverse effect on any single market. Large companies do barter, of
course. Their barter activity, however, most commonly takes the form
of sporadic, single transaction arrangements posing little, if any, economic or legal danger.
GreaterPotentialforProcompetitiveEffects
Antitrust analysis takes cognizance ofprocompetitive, as well as
anticompetitive effects. A practice causing anticompetitive effects may
50. For a description of the operations of one major barter exchange, Business Exchange,
Inc., see Myers, supra note 12, at 17.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
52. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 12, at 17; Using Barter, supra note 4, at 57.
53. See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
54. See generalY the authorities cited in notes 1-4 & 10 supra.
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be legal under section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the FTC Act
if the evidence also establishes substantial, counterbalancing procompetitive effects. This principle has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in a number of decisions, such as ContinentalT,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 55 and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc. 56 Included within the various effects which
can be viewed as procompetitive are improvement of conditions for
market entry,5 7 creation of a market, 58 stimulation of activity in an existing market, 59 and improvement of the production or distribution efficiency of a given firm or group of firms. 60 Effects such as these are, of
course, merely elements of total allocative efficiency. That is, they ordinarily have a positive effect on the overall efficiency of resource allocation. 6' Evidence indicating that results of this type have occurred, or
probably will occur, does not automatically legalize a challenged practice. But in many cases it will at least create a factual issue where the
evidence has also shown the likelihood of some adverse effects.
It is quite difficult under any circumstances to make a case for any
procompetitive effects of reciprocity. With barter, however, such a case
can be made in most circumstances. In contrast with reciprocity, the
procompetitive effects of barter often are the direct result of the completely different motives underlying most barter transactions.
Moving Inventory
The motive for barter in many situations is the need to move obsolete or otherwise stagnant inventory. 62 When inventory is so moved,
there are at least three positive economic results. First, particularly
when an organized barter exchange is employed, the result may be the
making and stimulation of a separate, identifiable market for particular
low-demand goods. A market-making effect has been recognized as a
legitimate goal of antitrust policy at least since the Supreme Court's
63
decision in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.
Second, regardless of whether an organized exchange is employed,
55. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
56. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
58. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
60. See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
61. See, e.g., D. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 26-33 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as GREER].
62. Thompson, supra note 1, at 93.
63. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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moving stagnant inventory by barter improves production efficiency. In
many cases this improvement of efficiency results simply from barter's
potential for mitigating the effects of poor production planning or unforeseeable demand changes.64
Third, moving excess inventory lowers a firm's (or an industry's)
interest cost and conserves capital investment. 65 In the end, all the positive results of excess inventory movement contribute to improved allocative efficiency by transferring capital investment to more desirable
goods or services. Experience has shown that a firm can often receive
greater value, and thus come closer to recovering costs, by bartering
excess inventory than by liquidating it under somewhat distressed
66
conditions.
Utilizing Excess Service Capacity
Similar improvement in allocative efficiency may result when services are bartered. Although an excess service capacity is not properly
characterized as excess inventory, a service-providing firm or individual which is capable of providing larger volumes of service than it currently sells has the equivalent of excess inventory for barter purposes.
A prime example is the common practice of advertising media to barter
their time or space for goods or for other services.67
Freeing Hoarded Commodities
Producers and other holders of commodities which are in short
supply sometimes tend to hoard. Such tendencies, which of course exacerbate the shortage, may result from (a) government price controls,
(b) a desire to reserve supplies for favored customers, (c) a fear that the
materials may end up in the hands of speculators, (d) a perception (correct or not) that market price has not yet peaked or (e) a feeling that
market price during the shortage will not rise to a level the holder views
68
as compensatory.
Barter apparently possesses a potential for overcoming at least part
of this reluctance to release scarce commodities. For example, during
the severe shortages of bulk industrial chemicals in 1973 and 1974, it
was found that holders of materials such as benzene, ethylene, phenol,
64. In lessening the effects of poor production planning, barter serves to mitigate Leibenstein's "X-inefficiency." See GREER, Smpra note 60, at 472.
65. Thompson, supra note 1, at 93.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 95.
68. See Bartering to Beat the Chemicals Shortage, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1973, at 90-94.
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and toluene could sometimes be induced to part with them in an exchange for other valuable chemicals when they otherwise would have
69
stockpiled them.
The mitigation of hoarding tendencies in times of shortage should
be viewed by antitrust enforcers and courts as a positive economic result and, when supported by evidence in a particular case, should fur70
ther differentiate barter from reciprocity.
Capital Scarcities
Barter possesses potential utility in times of capital shortage. Although barter certainly could not be expected to resolve a major, economy-wide capital problem, firms do in fact employ barter in
undertakings for which large amounts of capital are required, such as
new plants and equipment. 7' For particular firms, then, barter can
ameliorate a capital shortage.
AREAS OF CONCERN

Although barter ordinarily should be viewed as substantively different from reciprocity, it should not be totally immunized from scrutiny. Situations can exist in which barter may pose very real antitrust
concerns.

Coercion
A barter transaction, or series of them, could be imposed by one
firm on another through coercion. For instance, a large customer may
possess inordinate bargaining power in its dealings with a particular
supplier or class of suppliers. Threatened order withdrawals could be
used by the customer to induce the supplier to barter rather than to sell.
A supplier with undue market power might do the same thing in reverse to obtain scarce materials. In other words, coercive barter can be
employed to achieve precisely the same ends as coercive reciprocity.
Such an event seemingly would not ordinarily occur, however, because
purchases and sales would be more convenient. In the absence of legitimate motives for barter, a firm usually is not going to seek the less
69. Id.

70. Reciprocity could also be used to free hoarded goods, but this seems to rarely be the
actual motive or effect of reciprocity. See generaly Dauner, The Attitude ofthe Purchasing Agent
Toward Recqiroctiy, J. PURCHASING, Aug., 1967, at S.

71. This is true domestically, but seems to be even more common in international transactions. See, e.g., Back to Barter, ECONoMIsT, Dec. 14, 1974, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Back To
Barter); The Barter Boom, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1978, at 63.
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convenient transactional form. If such a practice occurs, though, it
should be just as illegal as coercive reciprocity.
Market Foreclosure
Consider the following scenario. Two competing oil companies,
Alpha and Beta, regularly exchange refined petroleum products. For
instance, Alpha may periodically have excess jet fuel on hand which it
trades to Beta for unleaded gasoline. The bartered products very likely
will remain at their current storage locations until needed by the new
owner for distribution. 72 Or Beta may be short on diesel fuel and obtain it from Alpha by drawing on a credit it had created by earlier
providing Alpha with kerosene and naphtha. This is all well and good.
At any given time it helps each firm to better correlate its existing stock
with customers' current needs.
This advantage for the two firms may, however, be purchased at a
cost to competition in the relevant markets. The most obvious negative
effect is marketforeclosure. In other words, a barter relationship which
is systematic over a lengthy period of time is going to shut off some
portion of the supply for the products involved. Similarly, it will shut
off a portion of the particular market that otherwise would have been
available to other suppliers. Foreclosure of other firms from supplies
and markets is the most important of barter's potential negative effects
for several reasons.
Certainty of Occurrence
If barter is systematic and ongoing among two or more firms, regardless of whether an organized exchange is employed, market foreclosure is a virtual certainty. Thus, foreclosure is not merely a
speculative effect to be weighed against the usually benign purposes of
the participants. Rather, it is a factor that must be introduced into the
calculus when barter is other than random and sporadic. The question,
though, is whether the degree to which a source of supply or a market is
foreclosed from nonparticipants in a given case is substantial enough to
be of concern. Usually, it seems, the substantiality of foreclosure
would be insufficient to counterbalance the procompetitive effects we
have observed.
Substantiality, of course, can be measured in different ways. As we
have seen, the courts have not looked charitably on tying agreements,
72. This apparently has been a fairly common oil industry practice. See Legal Developments
in Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING, 73, 75-76 (1972).
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primarily because of their perceived lack of redeeming virtues. 7 3 This
judicial hostility toward tying has been manifested, at least in part, by a
harsh standard for measuring the substantiality of the resulting foreclosure. 74 The yardstick, as we observed earlier, is the absolute dollar volume of sales to all customers in the affected market (i e., the market for
the "tied" product). 7 5 And the $190,000 which the Supreme Court has
indicated would be sufficient is not much.76
On the other hand, the standard for determining substantiality in
the case of exclusive dealing agreements is much less severe. An exclusive dealing agreement occurs when seller and buyer agree that the
buyer will purchase particular goods or services only from the seller
and not from others. It often takes the form of a requirementscontract
in which the buyer commits itself to purchase its requirements of a particular item during a particular period from the seller. Foreclosure is
the concern here as well. The courts have acknowledged that exclusive
dealing is much more likely than tying to have benign purposes and
positive effects. 77 This attitude has similarly found its outlet in the
method for determining whether foreclosure has been substantial
enough for a violation. The courts ordinarily have required a showing
that some substantialportionof the affected market has been foreclosed
to others. In StandardOil Co. of California v. United States,78 in which
a violation was found, the foreclosed portion was just under seven per
cent. In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. ,79 in which the challenged arrangement was found to be legal, the foreclosed portion was
less than one percent, although the value involved was $128 million.
Thus, this more lenient test for determining substantiality has resulted
in far fewer successful challenges to exclusive dealing agreements than
to tying agreements. 80
Although most courts probably will employ the stricter standard
for measuring substantiality in cases of reciprocity,8 the facial resemblance of barter and reciprocity should not lead them to adopt this
73. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
74. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
75. Id.
76. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
77. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 163.
78. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
79. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
80. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 163.
81. Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 831 (1979); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 13-14 (4th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1975), a'd, 537 F.2d 296
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258
F. Supp. 36, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also SULLIVAN, upra note 16, § 163.
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harsher test for barter. As we have seen, the underlying intent and the
ultimate effects ordinarily are just not the same. Barter should be accorded the same treatment as exclusive dealing because the former is at
least as likely as the latter to spring from legitimate motives and to
have neutral or positive economic effects.
Therefore, despite the certainty of foreclosure when barter is systematic and ongoing, this foreclosure is not likely to cause antitrust
problems unless the firms involved account for substantial shares of
affected markets. Large firms can barter, but they would be well advised to avoid permanent barter relationships.
Barter Between Competitors
In the hypothetical of Alpha and Beta, the bartering firms were
competitors. The danger of supply or market foreclosure does not depend on the existence of a competitive relationship between the participants. If they are competitors, however, the portion of the relevant
market affected stands a good chance of being greater than otherwise
would be the case. Thus, in the Alpha and Beta scenario, the jet fuel
market would be affected by both firms--on one occasion by Alpha, on
another by Beta. Over time the effect on this market, on any other
market in which they both produce, is likely to be greater than if only
one were a supplier of that product.
In addition to increasing the substantiality of foreclosure, both
participants being competitors may also cause other problems. To begin with, such an arrangement could lead in time to too cozy a relationship. The possibility of gradually inching into other arrangements
dulling the keen edge of competition is all too likely. Furthermore, the
arrangement could be used to disguise market division or price fixing
agreements between the two firms. Other evidence would be required,
of course, before Alpha and Beta's relationship could be so
characterized.8 2
Shortages
As we have seen, a materials shortage is one of the most important
catalysts for barter activity. Lessening the adverse effects of a materials
shortage is also one of the redeeming characteristics of barter. Paradoxically, barter also possesses the potential for exacerbating a commodities shortage. In effect, a shortage shrinks the base for
82. See GREER, supra note 60, at 429-3 1.
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determining how much of a market is foreclosed. When the firms participating in barter transactions during times of shortage are quite
large, there can be a very real danger of severing smaller firms from
sources of supply. In other words, firms with substantial market power
may very well be able to draw upon that power to the detriment of
those without similar power. 83 If these smaller firms are efficient, their
foreclosure represents a harm to the economy and to competition, not
just to the affected firms.
CONCLUSION

The facial similarity of barter and reciprocity cannot be ignored,
especially in light of the magnitude and persistence of barter's current
resurgence. Bartering between individuals and small firms should have
no antitrust implications. However, large firms should at least be
aware of barter's resemblance to reciprocity and should plan their
transactions so as to minimize the chance of antitrust litigation. The
similarities between barter and reciprocity are usually superficial only.
In most cases the two are quite different in substance, both in terms of
the participants' motivations and the actual or probable effects of the
transactions. Because barter is less likely to be motivated by an anticompetitive purpose, and more likely to produce neutral or positive
economic effects, it should not be viewed as just another form of
reciprocity.
The harsh standard applied to tying agreements (and probably to
reciprocity) should not be applied to barter. Instead, enforcement authorities and courts should employ the less severe standard which they
traditionally have used to judge exclusive dealing agreements. If the
proper standard is applied, barter should infrequently cause problems
under the antitrust laws. Firms holding substantial shares of affected
markets should avoid the type of systematic, ongoing barter relationships that may tend to develop a degree of permanence. Caution
would dictate, therefore, that large companies avoid regular and substantial involvement in organized barter exchanges. In addition, large
companies should take care not to intentionally or unintentionally put
a supply squeeze on smaller firms during a materials shortage. Still
more care should be taken if the barter transaction is with a competitor.
Finally, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Fed83. This concern has been expressed by both the FTC and the Justice Department. Back to
Barter, supra note 70, at 53; Wecksler, Bartering Is Going On. . But Is It Legal?, PURCHASING,
May 21, 1974, at 11.
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eral Trade Commission will not likely be pursuing new theories of antitrust liability under the Reagan administration. William Baxter, the
new head of the Antitrust Division has, in fact, given clear indications
that the Division will devote most of its resources to the more obvious
violations such as price fixing and market divisions between competitors.8 4 The "vertical" restraints not involving competitors, including
practices such as reciprocity, will not receive as much attention as in
the past. Antitrust enforcement attitudes are highly cyclical, however,
and this present attitude of retrenchment may be short-lived. Knowing
this, corporate counsel will surely continue to closely monitor their
firms' involvement in practices such as tying, reciprocity and barter. If
for no other reason, caution is still needed in these areas because the
present administration probably will not be able to exercise the con85
servative influence onprivate antitrust litigation that it would wish.

84. See, e.g., Vilkin, 00 Antitrust Nominee Shows Conservative Colors, Legal Times of
Wash., Mar. 23, 1981, at 8, col. 1-4.
85. Mr. Baxter has indicated that the Antitrust Division will increasingly participate as amicus curiae in private litigation in an attempt to persuade courts to favor his views. See, e.g., Legal
Times of Wash., May 18, 1981, at 7, cols. 3-4.
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